The Decline of Democracy in Indonesia: A Hobbesian Warning and Its Consequences for ASEAN Diplomacy

Introduction

Two decades after the 1998 Reformasi, Indonesia’s democracy was once hailed as one of the most remarkable achievements in Southeast Asia. Direct elections, press freedom, and civic participation were celebrated as milestones in the country’s transition from the authoritarian New Order regime. Yet, recent political developments suggest a troubling regression. The 2024 elections, the rise of dynastic politics, and waves of mass demonstrations against the House of Representatives (DPR) indicate that the substance of Indonesian democracy has steadily eroded.

To better grasp this situation, it is instructive to revisit the ideas of Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679), an English political philosopher who lived through civil war. In his seminal work Leviathan (1651), Hobbes articulated the notion of a social contract, whereby individuals surrender part of their freedoms to a sovereign authority in exchange for security. Without such authority, Hobbes argued, human life would be “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.” Yet the Hobbesian social contract was never meant to serve as a blank check: if rulers fail to provide security and instead abuse their power, the very essence of the contract collapses. Hobbes’ framework thus sheds light on the paradox of Indonesian democracy, which appears functional in its procedures but hollow in its spirit. 

Hobbes’ Social Contract and Indonesian Politics

The Reformasi of 1998 can be understood as a new social contract: the people rejected authoritarianism and embraced democracy as the foundation of governance. The expectations were clear—political freedom, fair representation, and a state committed to protecting citizens’ rights. Yet the trajectory of Indonesian politics today reveals an erosion of trust.

The 2024 election illustrates this crisis. A major controversy erupted when the Constitutional Court altered the minimum age requirement for presidential and vice-presidential candidates. This change clearly appeared to benefit one particular vice-presidential candidate, Gibran Rakabuming, who is none other than the biological son of the former president, Joko Widodo. Many citizens perceived the ruling not as an act of judicial independence but as a calculated maneuver to entrench dynastic power. The increasingly overt practice of political dynasties illustrates how authority is now tilted toward familial and oligarchic interests rather than the people. As a result, the democratic arena, which should ensure fair competition and equal opportunity, has been reduced to a playing field for a narrow elite.

This dynamic evokes Hobbes’ defense of absolute monarchy, albeit in a different form. For Hobbes, sovereign monarchy was necessary to guarantee stability. In Indonesia, however, dynastic politics undermines the very essence of democracy and erodes the legitimacy of the social contract.

The crisis of trust has become even more visible in mass demonstrations against the DPR, particularly in response to contentious issues such as the weakening of the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) or the ratification of the new Criminal Code (KUHP). For many, the DPR no longer functions as a genuine representative body but rather as an extension of elite interests. In Hobbesian terms, citizens originally surrendered certain freedoms for the sake of security; yet when the state itself becomes a threat to civil rights, the contract can be said to have been violated.

Implications for Indonesia’s Diplomacy in ASEAN

The decline of democracy in Indonesia is not merely a domestic concern; it also reverberates in the regional arena, particularly within ASEAN. For years, Indonesia was regarded as the “democratic locomotive” of Southeast Asia. However, as the quality of its democracy has declined, that perception has begun to fade.